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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we axiomatize prefer-
ence relations on a σ-algebra of a saturated measure space represented
by a vector measure and furnish a utility representation in terms of a
nonadditive measure satisfying the appropriate requirement of conti-
nuity and convexity. Second, we investigate the fair division problems
in which each individual has nonadditive preferences on a σ-algebra
invoking our utility representation result. We show the existence of
individually rational Pareto optimal partitions, Walrasian equilibria,
core partitions, and Pareto optimal envy-free partitions.
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1 Introduction
Dividing a fixed amount of resources among members of a society to achieve
efficiency and fairness is a central theme of social decision making. The first
constructive solution to the problem of dividing a “cake” fairly was provided
by Steinhaus [48]. Here, cake is simply a metaphor for a heterogeneously
divisible commodity, and subsequently, the problem was formulated elegantly
in Dubins and Spanier [11] as a partitioning problem in a measure space in
which the preferences of each individual for pieces of a cake are represented
by a nonatomic probability measure. Although the mathematical problem
under investigation has attracted considerable attention in recent years, it
has a long history. For the historical background, see [4, Chapter 1] and
[6, Chapter 2]. Regarding the existence of various solutions for efficiency
and fairness and the construction of the protocol/algorithm to obtain fair
solutions, satisfactory results have been obtained under the additivity of
preferences of each individual; see [4, 11, 50] for the nonconstructive existence
of solutions and [6, 38] for the construction of the protocol/algorithm for fair
solutions.
Incidentally, representing preference relations on a σ-algebra by means
of a probability measure means that the utility function inevitably exhibits
“constant marginal utility”. This implies that given an additional element X
in a σ-algebra Σ, the utility function ν on Σ given by a probability measure
satisfies ν(A ∪ X) − ν(A) = ν(X) for every A ∈ Σ that is disjoint from X ,
which reveals that the marginal utility is independent of A. Obviously, this
is a severe restriction on preference relations that is difficult to justify from
an economics point of view. Thus, the reasonable conditions under which the
preferences of each individual can have nonadditive representations should
be addressed for fair division problems. For earlier attempts to axiomatize
the preference relations on a finite measure space with their continuous rep-
resentation by means of a nonadditive measure, see [8, 44].
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we axiomatize preference
relations on a σ-algebra of a finite measure space represented by a vector
measure and furnish a utility representation in terms of a nonadditive mea-
sure that satisfies the appropriate requirement of continuity and convexity,
which presents a different approach from [8, 44] with a numerical represen-
tation of preference relations by means of a nonatomic finite measure. The
axioms we introduce here guarantee that the utility functions on a σ-algebra
are continuous quasiconcave transformations of a vector measure with val-
ues in a Banach space, which lays the axiomatic foundation for nonadditive
utility functions exploited in [17, 18, 20, 39] for fair division problems. In
particular, if the underlying measure space is “saturated” as formulated in
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[13, 16, 22], then such a utility representation is always viable in a sepa-
rable Banach space along with the Lyapunov convexity theorem in infinite
dimensions established in [24, 26, 27]. This utility representation has a great
advantage because the preference relations on a σ-algebra have a continuous
convex extension to the set of measurable functions with values in the unit
interval. We characterize the saturation of measure spaces in terms of the
continuous extensions of preference relations on σ-algebras.
Second, we investigate the fair division problems in which each individ-
ual has nonadditive preferences on a σ-algebra invoking our utility repre-
sentation result. If the preferences of each individual are represented by a
nonatomic probability measure, then the classical Lyapunov convexity theo-
rem [30] guarantees the compactness and convexity of the utility possibility
set and thereby makes it possible to establish the existence of solutions with
respect to efficiency and fairness; see [4, 11, 50]. In consideration of nonad-
ditive utility functions on σ-algebras, such favorable properties are no longer
valid. For the clarification of the role of the nonatomicity hypothesis in the
fair division problems with additive utility functions on σ-algebras, see the
survey article [41].
To overcome the difficulty with nonadditive utility functions on σ-alge-
bras, as in [1, 7, 20], we subsume partitions of an economy in which the pref-
erences of each individual are represented by a continuous transformation of
a vector measure into allocations of its extended economy with the commod-
ity space of L∞ in which the preferences of each individual on a σ-algebra are
continuously extended to the subset of functions in L∞ with values in the unit
interval. We clarify the role of saturation of the underlying measure space to
formulate the indifference relation for each individual between partitions and
allocations, which provides another characterization of saturation. Under the
saturation hypothesis, we show the existence of individually rational Pareto
optimal partitions without any convexity assumption on the preferences of
each individual and the existence of Walrasian equilibria, core partitions, and
Pareto optimal envy-free partitions under the convexity assumption.
The paper is organized as follows. After the brief introduction of sat-
urated measure spaces and the Lyapunov convexity theorem in separable
Banach spaces in Section 2, the axiomatization for the preference relations
on a σ-algebra is given in Section 3. The fair division problems are framed
in Section 4 and the existence results on fair partitions are provided under
the saturation hypothesis. Lastly, an open question is stated in Section 5 as
a concluding remark.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Lyapunov Convexity Theorem in Saturated Mea-
sure Spaces
Throughout this paper, we always assume that (Ω,Σ, µ) is a finite measure
space. A measure space (Ω,Σ, µ) is said to be essentially countably generated
if its σ-algebra can be generated by a countable number of subsets together
with the null sets; (Ω,Σ, µ) is said to be essentially uncountably generated
whenever it is not essentially countably generated. Let ΣX = {X∩A | A ∈ Σ}
be the σ-algebra restricted to X ∈ Σ. Denote by L1(X,ΣX , µ) the space of
µ-integrable functions on the measurable space (X,ΣX) whose elements are
restrictions of functions in L1(Ω,Σ, µ) to X . An equivalence relation ≡ on
Σ is given by A ≡ B ⇐⇒ µ(A△B) = 0, where A△B is the symmetric
difference of A and B in Σ. The collection of equivalence classes is denoted
by Σ(µ) = Σ/ ≡ and its generic element Â is the equivalence class of A ∈ Σ.
The metric ρ on Σ(µ) is defined by ρ(Â, B̂) = µ(A△B). Then (Σ(µ), ρ) is
a complete metric space (see [2, Lemma 13.13]) and (Σ(µ), ρ) is separable if
and only if L1(Ω,Σ, µ) is separable (see [2, Lemma 13.14]). The density of
(Σ(µ), ρ) is the smallest cardinal number of the form |U|, where U is a dense
subset of Σ(µ).
Definition 2.1. A finite measure space (Ω,Σ, µ) is saturated if L1(X,ΣX , µ)
is nonseparable for every X ∈ Σ with µ(X) > 0. We say that a finite measure
space has the saturation property if it is saturated.
Saturation implies nonatomicity and several equivalent definitions for sat-
uration are known; see [13, 14, 16, 22]. One of the simple characterizations
of the saturation property is as follows. A finite measure space (Ω,Σ, µ) is
saturated if and only if (X,ΣX , µ) is essentially uncountably generated for
every X ∈ Σ with µ(X) > 0. The saturation of finite measure spaces is also
synonymous with the uncountability of the density of ΣX(µ) for every X ∈ Σ
with µ(X) > 0; see [14, 331Y(e)]. An inceptive notion of saturation already
appeared in [21, 31].
Let E be a Banach space. For a vector measure m : Σ→ E, a set N ∈ Σ
is said to be m-null if m(A ∩ N) = 0 for every A ∈ Σ. A vector measure
m : Σ→ E is said to be µ-continuous (or absolutely continuous with respect
to µ) if every µ-null set is m-null. Let S := {f ∈ L∞(Ω,Σ, µ) | 0 ≤ f ≤ 1},
which is a weakly∗compact, convex subset of L∞(Ω,Σ, µ), and definem(S) :=
{
∫
fdm ∈ E | f ∈ S}. Since the integration operator Tm : L
∞(Ω,Σ, µ)→ E
defined by Tm(f) :=
∫
fdm is continuous with respect to the weak∗ topology
3
of L∞(Ω,Σ, µ) and the weak topology of E (see [10, Lemma IX.1.3]), the set
m(S) is weakly compact and convex in E.
The saturation property and the Lyapunov convexity theorem in separa-
ble Banach spaces are a major apparatus in this paper.
Proposition 2.1 (Khan and Sagara [24]). Let E be a separable Banach
space. If (Ω,Σ, µ) is saturated, then for every µ-continuous vector measure
m : Σ → E, its range m(Σ) is weakly compact and convex with m(Σ) =
m(S). Conversely, if every µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → E has
the weakly compact convex range, then (Ω,Σ, µ) is saturated whenever E is
infinite dimensional.
Remark 2.1. The significance of the saturation property lies in the fact that
it is necessary and sufficient for the weak compactness and the convexity of
the Bochner integral of a multifunction as well as the Lyapunov convexity
theorem; see [24, 25, 26, 27, 37, 49]. For the further generalization of Propo-
sition 2.1 to nonseparable locally convex spaces, see [15, 26, 27, 43]. Another
intriguing characterization of saturation in terms of the existence of Nash
equilibria in large games is found in [22].
3 Vector Representation of Preference Rela-
tions on σ-Algebras
3.1 Axioms for Preference Relations
Let (Ω,Σ, µ) be a finite measure space. A binary relation on the σ-algebra Σ
is a subset of the product space Σ× Σ. The preference relation % on Σ is a
complete transitive binary relation on Σ. We denote by A % B the relation
(A,B) ∈ %. The indifference and strict preference relations are defined
respectively by A ∼ B ⇐⇒ A % B and B % A and by A ≻ B ⇐⇒ A % B
and A 6∼ B. A real-valued function ν : Σ → R is called a utility function
representing % if for every A,B ∈ Σ: ν(A) ≥ ν(B) ⇐⇒ A % B. A set
function ν : Σ→ R is called a nonadditive measure if ν(∅) = 0.
Axiom 3.1 (vector representation). There exist a Banach space E and a
µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → E such that m(A) = m(B) implies
A ∼ B.
The axiom enables one to define the preference relation R on m(Σ) by
∀x, y ∈ m(Σ) : xR y
def
⇐⇒ A % B with x = m(A) and y = m(B). (3.1)
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A preference relation on Σ satisfying Axiom 3.1 is said to admit a vector
representation in E. A vector representation for % is not unique because
any scalar multiplication of m is consistent with Axiom 3.1. In addition, the
observation that % may admit a vector representation in another Banach
space motivates one to introduce the following axiom. (In what follows, we
assume that % admits a vector representation in a Banach space E via a
µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ→ E.)
Axiom 3.2 (commutativity). If % admits another vector representation in
a Banach space F via a µ-continuous vector measure n : Σ→ F , then there
exists a unique continuous linear operator T : E → F such that n = T ◦m.
By the symmetric treatment of E and F , the axiom guarantees that there
exists a unique continuous linear operator U : F → E such that m = U ◦ n.
Then (U ◦ T )m = m and (T ◦ U)n = n. The situation is illustrated in the
diagram below:
E
T

OO
UΣ
m
>>
n   
F
A preference relation on Σ satisfying Axiom 3.2 is said to admit commuta-
tivity in E. Commutativity guarantees that the vector representation for %
is unique up to the equivalence in the following sense. Let V(Σ, µ) be the set
of µ-continuous vector measures on Σ with values in any Banach space. A
typical element in V(Σ, µ) is denoted by (m,E) to distinguish explicitly the
range spaces of vector measures. Define the equivalence relation on V(Σ, µ)
by (m,E) ≃ (n, F )
def
⇐⇒ there exists a unique pair of continuous linear op-
erators T : E → F and U : F → E such that n = T ◦m and m = U ◦ n.
As defined in (3.1), the commutativity for % yields an induced preference
relation Q on n(Σ). Thus, for every x, y ∈ m(Σ): xR y ⇐⇒ TxQ Ty and
for every v, w ∈ n(Σ): vQw ⇐⇒ UvR Uw.
Axiom 3.3 (monotonicity). For every A,B ∈ Σ with A ⊃ B andm(A\B) 6=
0, we have A ≻ B.
The axiom is equivalent to the monotonicity of R on m(Σ): for every x, y ∈
m(Σ) with x + y ∈ m(Σ) and y 6= 0, we have x + yR x, but not xR x + y.
A preference relation on Σ satisfying Axiom 3.3 is said to admit a monotone
representation in E.
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Axiom 3.4 (continuity). For every A,B ∈ Σ: Ak % B for each k ∈ N with
m(Ak) → m(A) as k → ∞ implies A % B and A % Bk for each k ∈ N with
m(Bk)→ m(B) implies A % B.
The axiom is equivalent to the continuity of R on m(Σ): for every x ∈ m(Σ),
both the upper contour set {y ∈ m(Σ) | yR x} and the lower contour set
{y ∈ m(Σ) | xR y} are closed in m(Σ). A preference relation on Σ satisfying
Axiom 3.4 is said to admit a continuous representation in E.
Axiom 3.5 (convexity). Suppose that m(Σ) is convex. For every A ∈ Σ,
the set m({B ∈ Σ | B % A}) is convex.
The axiom is equivalent to the convexity of R on m(Σ): for every x ∈ m(Σ),
the upper contour set {y ∈ m(Σ) | yR x} is convex. A preference relation on
Σ satisfying Axiom 3.5 is said to admit a convex representation in E. Note
that the convexity of m(Σ) is not automatic even when m is nonatomic be-
cause of the well-known failure of the Lyapunov convexity theorem in infinite
dimensions (for counterexamples in which the Lyapunov convexity theorem
fails in infinite dimensions, see [10, Examples IX.1.1 and IX.1.2]).
3.2 Utility Functions on Σ
Axioms 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4 guarantee the unique representation of % in terms
of a nonadditive measure on Σ given by a continuous transformation of a
vector measure. If, moreover, Axiom 3.5 is imposed, then the representation
is a quasiconcave transformation of a vector measure.
Theorem 3.1. A preference relation % on Σ admits a continuous (and con-
vex) representation in a separable Banach space E if and only if there exist
a µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → E (with m(Σ) being convex) and a
continuous (and quasiconcave) function ϕ : m(Σ) → R with ϕ(0) = 0 such
that:
∀A,B ∈ Σ : A % B ⇐⇒ ϕ(m(A)) ≥ ϕ(m(B)). (3.2)
If, furthermore, % admits commutativity, then the continuous (and convex)
representation via (m,E) ∈ V(Σ, µ) is unique up to the equivalence classes
in V(Σ, µ)/ ≃.
Proof. Suppose that % admits a continuous (and convex) representation in
a separable Banach space E. Then there exists a µ-continuous vector mea-
sure m : Σ → E (with m(Σ) being convex) such that (3.1) holds. Since the
induced preference relation R on m(Σ) is continuous (and convex) and E is
separable, by the celebrated theorem of Debreu [9], there exists a continu-
ous (and quasiconcave) function ϕ : m(Σ) → R representing the preference
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relation R on m(Σ), that is, xR y ⇐⇒ ϕ(x) ≥ ϕ(y). Therefore, ϕ ◦m is a
utility function on Σ representing the preference relation % on Σ. By replac-
ing ϕ(x) with ϕ(x) − ϕ(0) if necessary, without loss of generality one may
assume that ϕ(0) = 0. The converse implication is obvious without assuming
the separability of E.
Denote by L1E(Ω,Σ, µ) the space of E-valued Bochner integrable functions
on Ω. A Banach space E has the Radon–Nikodym property (RNP) for a finite
measure space (Ω,Σ, µ) if for every µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ→ E
of bounded variation, there exists u ∈ L1E(Ω,Σ, µ) such that m(A) =
∫
A
udµ
for every A ∈ Σ. Note that for every Banach space E, given a Bochner
integrable function u ∈ L1E(Ω,Σ, µ), the vector measure m
u : Σ→ E defined
by the indefinite integral mu(A) :=
∫
A
udµ for A ∈ Σ is of bounded variation;
see [10, Theorem II.2.4]. This observation yields the following result.
Corollary 3.1. A preference relation % on Σ admits a continuous (and con-
vex) representation in a separable Banach space E with the RNP for (Ω,Σ, µ)
if and only if there exist a Bochner integrable function u ∈ L1E(Ω,Σ, µ)
(with mu(Σ) being convex) and a continuous (and quasiconcave) function
ϕ : mu(Σ)→ R with ϕ(0) = 0 such that:
∀A,B ∈ Σ : A % B ⇐⇒ ϕ
(∫
A
u(ω)dµ
)
≥ ϕ
(∫
B
u(ω)dµ
)
.
Example 3.1. Let (Ω,Σ, µ) be a nonatomic finite measure space and f ∈
L1(Ω,Σ, µ) be a nonnegative integrable function. If % is such that for every
A,B ∈ Σ: A % B
def
⇐⇒
∫
A
fdµ ≥
∫
B
fdµ, then % admits a vector represen-
tation in the real field R via the µ-continuous nonatomic finite measure ν
defined by ν(A) :=
∫
A
fdµ and satisfies Axioms 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. Con-
versely, if % admits a vector representation in R via the µ-continuous σ-finite
measure ν and satisfies Axioms 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, then by Theorem 3.1,
there exists a continuous quasiconcave function ϕ : ν(Σ)→ R with ϕ(0) = 0
such that for every A,B ∈ Σ: A % B ⇐⇒ ϕ(
∫
A
fdµ) ≥ ϕ(
∫
B
fdµ), where
f ∈ L1(Ω,Σ, µ) is a Radon–Nikodym derivative of ν. In this specific case,
% admits a continuous convex representation with a quasiconcave integral
transformation on Σ.
Remark 3.1. Note that the proof of Theorem 3.1 demonstrates that if
(Ω,Σ, µ) is a nonatomic finite measure space, then % admits a continuous
(and convex) representation in Rl if and only if there exist a µ-continuous
vector measure m : Σ → Rl with its range m(Σ) being compact and convex
and a continuous (and quasiconcave) function ϕ : m(Σ) → R with ϕ(0) = 0
satisfying (3.2). This is an immediate consequence of the classical Lyapunov
convexity theorem in view of the nonatomicity of m.
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3.3 Continuous Extensions to S
Denote by χA the characteristic function of A ∈ Σ. Then χA ∈ S for every
A ∈ Σ. A preference relation %⋄ on S is a complete transitive binary relation
on S. A preference relation %⋄ is said to be continuous if for every f ∈ S
both the upper contour set {g ∈ S | g%⋄ f} and the lower contour set
{g ∈ S | f %⋄ g} are weakly∗ closed in S; %⋄ is said to be convex if for every
f ∈ S the upper contour set {g ∈ S | g%⋄ f} is convex; %⋄ is said to be
monotone if f ≥ g with f 6= g imply f ≻ g; %⋄ is called an extension of the
preference relation % on Σ if for every A,B ∈ Σ: χA %
⋄ χB ⇐⇒ A % B.
If % is represented by a utility function of the form ϕ ◦ m on Σ, where
m is a µ-continuous vector measure with values in a Banach space E (with
m(Σ) being convex) and ϕ is a continuous (and quasiconcave) function on
m(Σ) with a continuous (and quasiconcave) extension ϕ⋄ to m(S), then the
continuous (and convex) extension %⋄ of % to S is given by:
∀f, g ∈ S : f %⋄g
def
⇐⇒ ϕ⋄
(∫
Ω
f(ω)dm
)
≥ ϕ⋄
(∫
Ω
g(ω)dm
)
. (3.3)
The continuous (and convex) extension %⋄ defined in this way is called
a (quasiconcave) integral transformation on S. Then the utility function
ν⋄ : S → R defined by ν⋄(f) := ϕ⋄(
∫
fdm) is weakly∗ continuous (and
quasiconcave) on S in view of the fact that the integration operator Tm is
continuous with respect to the weak∗ topology of L∞(Ω,Σ, µ) and the weak
topology of E, as noted above.
Theorem 3.2. Let (Ω,Σ, µ) be a saturated finite measure space. Then every
preference relation % on Σ with a continuous representation in a separable
Banach space has a continuous extension %⋄ to S with an integral transfor-
mation such that for every f ∈ S there exists A ∈ Σ satisfying f ∼⋄ χA.
Proof. Let % be a preference relation on Σ that admits a continuous repre-
sentation in a separable Banach space E. By Theorem 3.1, % has a utility
function of the form ϕ ◦m, where m is a µ-continuous vector measure with
values in a separable Banach space E and ϕ is a continuous function on
m(Σ). In view of Proposition 2.1, m(Σ) = m(S), and hence, the desired
extension %⋄ of % to S is given by the formula (3.3) with ϕ = ϕ⋄.
The converse of Theorem 3.2 is true in the following sense, which provides
another characterization of saturation.
Theorem 3.3. A finite measure space (Ω,Σ, µ) is saturated if every prefer-
ence relation % on Σ with a continuous representation in an infinite-dimen-
sional Banach space and its continuous extension %⋄ to S with an integral
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transformation are such that for every f ∈ S there exists A ∈ Σ satisfying
f ∼⋄ χA.
Proof. Suppose that (Ω,Σ, µ) is not saturated. Then for every infinite-
dimensional Banach space E, there exists a µ-continuous vector measure
m : Σ → E such that its range m(Σ) is not convex; see [37, Lemma 4]
and [49, Remark 1]. Then there exist x, y ∈ m(Σ) and t ∈ (0, 1) such that
tx + (1 − t)y 6∈ m(Σ). Let C,D ∈ Σ be such that x = m(C) and y = m(D)
and define fˆ := tχC + (1 − t)χD ∈ S. Let ϕ
⋄ : m(S) → R be a continu-
ous function with ϕ⋄(0) = 0 that attains the maximum at the unique point
xˆ :=
∫
fˆdm ∈ m(S) (such a function can be simply given by, for instance,
the strictly concave continuous function ϕ⋄(z) = ‖xˆ‖ − ‖xˆ − z‖). Define
the preference relation %⋄ on S via (3.3) and denote its restriction to Σ by
%. Then % admits a continuous representation in the Banach space E by
Theorem 3.1 (the separability of E is unnecessary here) and %⋄ is a con-
tinuous extension of % with an integral transformation. Hence, there exists
A ∈ Σ such that fˆ ∼⋄ χA. This means that ϕ
⋄(xˆ) = ϕ⋄(m(A)), and hence,
xˆ = tx+ (1− t)y = m(A) ∈ m(Σ), a contradiction.
Remark 3.2. The continuous extension of nonadditive measures on Σ to
S with an integral transformation explored in Theorem 3.2 is a further im-
provement of [19] under the saturation hypothesis incorporating infinite di-
mensional vector representation. An alternative formulation of the convexity
of preference relations on σ-algebras and their representation in terms of
a nonadditive measure with the quasiconcavity-like property based on the
Lyapunov convexity theorem in finite dimensions were studied in [44]. For
continuous concave extensions of nonadditive measures to L∞(Ω,Σ, µ) based
on Choquet integrals and the support functionals of the cores of exact games,
see [42].
4 Fair Division in Saturated Measure Spaces
4.1 Extensions of Economies
The problem of dividing a heterogeneous commodity among a finite number
of individuals is formulated as partitioning in a finite measure space (Ω,Σ, µ).
Here, the set Ω is a heterogeneously divisible commodity, the σ-algebra Σ
of subsets of Ω denotes the collection of possible pieces of Ω, and the finite
measure µ describes an objective evaluation for a cardinal attribute of each
piece in Σ. There are n individuals and the set of individuals is denoted by
I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, each of whom is indexed by i ∈ I, whose preference relation
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%i is defined on a common consumption set Σ. Each individual possesses
an initial endowment Ωi ∈ Σ, for which Ωi ∩ Ωj = ∅ for each i 6= j and⋃n
i=1Ωi = Ω. A partition of Ω is an ordered n-tuple (A1, . . . , An) of mutually
disjoint sets A1, . . . , An in Σ whose union is Ω, where each Ai is a share of
the divisible commodity Ω given to individual i ∈ I. Thus, (Ω1, . . . ,Ωn) is
an initial partition of Ω. An economy E = {(Ω,Σ, µ), (%i,Ωi)
n
i=1} consists of
the commodity space (Ω,Σ, µ), the common consumption set Σ, on which a
preference relation %i is defined for each i ∈ I, and the initial endowment Ωi
of each individual.
Following [1, 7, 19], we subsume economies with commodity space (Ω,Σ, µ)
into ones with commodity space L∞(Ω,Σ, µ). If each %⋄i is a preference
relation on S that is an extension of %i given an economy E , then E
⋄ =
{L∞(Ω,Σ, µ),S, (%⋄i , χΩi)
n
i=1} is called an extended economy of E , which con-
sists of the commodity space L∞(Ω,Σ, µ), the common consumption set S,
on which a preference relation %⋄i is defined for each i ∈ I, and the initial
endowment χΩi ∈ S of each individual. If %i is represented by a utility func-
tion of the form ϕi ◦mi on Σ, where mi is a µ-continuous vector measure and
ϕi is a continuous (and quasiconcave) function on m(Σ) (with m(Σ) being
convex) that has an continuous (and quasiconcave) extension ϕ⋄i to mi(S),
then a continuous (and convex) extension %⋄i to S with a (quasiconcave)
integral transformation of the preference relation %i on Σ is given by the
formula (3.3). In this case, E⋄ is called an extended economy of E with a
(quasiconcave) integral transformation. An ordered n-tuple (f1, . . . , fn) of
functions in L∞(Ω,Σ, µ) is called an allocation of χΩ if
∑n
i=1 fi(ω) = 1 for
every ω ∈ Ω and fi ∈ S for each i ∈ I. Every A ∈ Σ is identified with its
characteristic function χA in S. Note that (A1, . . . , An) is a partition of Ω if
and only if (χA1, . . . , χAn) is an allocation of χΩ.
Definition 4.1. An allocation (f1, . . . , fn) of χΩ is said to be:
(i) individually rational if fi %
⋄
i χΩi for each i ∈ I;
(ii) Pareto optimal if there is no allocation (g1, . . . , gn) such that gi %
⋄
i fi
for each i ∈ I and gj ≻
⋄
j fj for some j ∈ I;
(iii) envy-free if fj %
⋄
i fi for each i, j ∈ I.
A nonempty subset of I is called a coalition. The family of coalitions is
denoted by I with its typical element denoted by S ∈ I. For a coalition
S ∈ I, an allocation (f1, . . . , fn) of χΩ is called an S-allocation if
∑
i∈S fi =∑
i∈S χΩi . Then an I-allocation is nothing but an allocation of χΩ.
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Definition 4.2. A coalition S ∈ I is said to improve upon an allocation
(f1, . . . , fn) of χΩ if there exists an S-allocation (g1, . . . , gn) such that gi ≻
⋄
i fi
for each i ∈ S. An allocation of χΩ that cannot be improved upon by any
coalition is called a core allocation.
Let ba(Σ, µ) be the space of finitely additive signed measures vanishing
on µ-null sets, which is the price space for the heterogeneously divisible
commodity (Ω,Σ, µ). A price p ∈ ba(Σ, µ) is said to be positive if p(A) ≥ 0
for every A ∈ Σ and p 6= 0. The dual space of L∞(Ω,Σ, µ) is ba(Σ, µ),
whose duality relation is denoted by 〈p, f〉 =
∫
fdp for p ∈ ba(Σ, µ) and
f ∈ L∞(Ω,Σ, µ). Given price p ∈ ba(Σ, µ), the budget set of each individual
is given by B⋄i (p, χΩi) := {f ∈ S | 〈p, f〉 ≤ 〈p, χΩi〉}.
Definition 4.3. A price-allocation pair (p, (f1, . . . , fn)) is called aWalrasian
equilibrium if fi is a maximal element for %i on B
⋄
i (p, χΩi) for each i ∈ I.
Denote by P the set of partitions of Ω, by PIR the set of individually
rational partitions, by PPO the set of Pareto optimal partitions, by PEF the
set of envy-free partitions, by PC the set of core partitions, and by PWE the
set of Walrasian equilibrium partitions respectively in E . Then the inclusion
PWE ⊂ PC ⊂ PIR ∩ PPO is trivial by definition. Denote by A the set of
partitions of χΩ, by AIR the set of individually rational partitions, by APO
the set of Pareto optimal partitions, by AEF the set of envy-free partitions, by
AC the set of core allocations, and by AWE the set of Walrasian equilibrium
allocations respectively. Then the inclusion AWE ⊂ AC ⊂ AIR ∩ APO is
trivial by definition. For every economy E and its extended economy E⋄, the
inclusions P ⊂ A, PIR ⊂ AIR, and PEF ⊂ AEF are automatic.
In what follows, we assume that each %i admits a continuous represen-
tation in a separable Banach space Ei. In view of Theorem 3.1, each %i
is represented by a utility function ϕi ◦ mi on Σ, where mi : Σ → Ei is a
µ-continuous vector measure and ϕi : mi(Σ) → R is a continuous function.
The utility function of this form means that each individual evaluates any
measurable subset A of the heterogeneously divisible commodity (Ω,Σ, µ) in
terms of the subjective cardinal attribute mi(A) with a vector representation
in Ei. When Ei = R
li, there are li cardinal attributes for the heteroge-
neously divisible commodity that is significant to individual i, which is the
specification modelled in [17, 18, 19, 39].
Remark 4.1. Since an extended economy E⋄ of E is nothing but a standard
exchange economy with commodity space L∞(Ω,Σ, µ), the existence of Wal-
rasian equilibria for E⋄ simply follows from exactly the same argument as in
[5] if one imposes Mackey continuity and convexity on each %⋄i . In the proof
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of Theorem 4.5 below, we demonstrate the existence of Walrasian equilibria
for E⋄ in a more specific setting.
4.2 A Characterization of Saturation
The power of saturation is exemplified in the indifference relation between
partitions in E and allocations in the extended economy E⋄ of the original
economy E . The proof presented here is based on the Lyapunov convex-
ity theorem in separable Banach spaces (Proposition 2.1) and the extreme
point argument in the weakly∗ compact subset of L∞ inspired by a functional
analytic approach originated in [29] and then explored in [1, 19].
Theorem 4.1. Let (Ω,Σ, µ) be a saturated finite measure space. Then every
economy E = {(Ω,Σ, µ), (%i,Ωi)
n
i=1} for which each %i admits a continuous
representation in a separable Banach space has its extended economy E⋄ =
{L∞(Ω,Σ, µ),S, (%⋄i , χΩi)
n
i=1} with an integral transformation such that for
every allocation (f1, . . . , fn) in E
⋄, there exists a partition (A1, . . . , An) in E
satisfying fi ∼
⋄
i χAi for each i ∈ I.
Proof. Let E = {(Ω,Σ, µ), (%i,Ωi)
n
i=1} be an economy satisfying the hypothe-
sis of the theorem. In view of Theorem 3.1, each %i is represented by a utility
function of the form ϕi ◦mi, where mi is a µ-continuous vector measure with
values in a separable Banach space Ei and ϕi is a continuous function on
mi(Σ). Since mi(Σ) = mi(S) for each i ∈ I by Proposition 2.1, E possesses
its extended economy E⋄ = {L∞(Ω,Σ, µ),S, (%⋄i , χΩi)
n
i=1} with an integral
transformation determined by the formula (3.3). Then as demonstrated in
[20, Lemma 3.2], by the Banach–Alaoglu theorem [12, Corollary V.4.4], A is
weakly∗ compact in the n-fold product space [L∞(Ω,Σ, µ)]n of L∞(Ω,Σ, µ).
Take any (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ A and let
A(f1, . . . , fn) := {(g1, . . . , gn) ∈ A | gi ∼
⋄
i fi ∀i ∈ I} .
Since each %⋄i is continuous, the set A(f1, . . . , fn) is nonempty and weakly
∗
compact in [L∞(Ω,Σ, µ)]n. According to the Krein–Milman theorem [12,
Lemma V.8.2], A(f1, . . . , fn) has an extreme point (g1, . . . , gn). We claim
that each of gi is a characteristic function. Suppose, to the contrary, that
gj is not a characteristic function for some j. By virtue of the fact that∑n
i=1 gi = 1 and gi ≥ 0 for each i ∈ I, we may assume without loss of
generality that there exist ε > 0 and A ∈ Σ with µ(A) > 0 such that
ε < g1, g2 < 1 − ε on A. Define the µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ →
R ×
∏n
i=1Ei by m := (µ,m1, . . . , mn). It follows from Proposition 2.1 that
there exists a measurable subset B ⊂ A such that m(B) = m(A)/2. Set
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h = ε(χA − 2χB). Then h 6= 0, 0 ≤ g1 ± h, g2 ± h ≤ 1, and
∫
hdm = 0.
Since ϕi(
∫
(gi ± h)dmi) = ϕi(
∫
gidmi) = ϕi(
∫
fidmi) for i = 1, 2, we have
(g1 ± h, g2 ∓ h, g3, . . . , gn) ∈ A(f1, . . . , fn). This yields:
(g1, . . . , gn) =
1
2
[(g1 + h, g2 − h, g3, . . . , gn) + (g1 − h, g2 + h, g3, . . . , gn)] ,
which means that (g1, . . . , gn) is a convex combination of two distinct ele-
ments (g1+h, g2−h, g3, . . . , gn) and (g1−h, g2+h, g3, . . . , gn) in A(f1, . . . , fn),
an obvious contradiction to the fact that (g1, . . . , gn) is an extreme point in
A(f1, . . . , fn).
Corollary 4.1. If E has its extended economy E⋄ with an integral trans-
formation, then the inclusions PPO ⊂ APO and PC ⊂ AC hold whenever
(Ω,Σ, µ) is saturated.
Proof. To demonstrate the first inclusion, take any Pareto optimal partition
(A1, . . . , An) in E . If (χA1 , . . . , χAn) is not a Pareto optimal allocation in E
⋄,
then there exists another allocation (f1, . . . , fn) such that fi %
⋄
i χAi for each
i ∈ I and fj ≻
⋄
j χAj for some j ∈ I. It follows from Theorem 4.1 that there
exists a partition (B1, . . . , Bn) in E such that fi ∼
⋄
i χBi for each i ∈ I, which
yields Bi %i Ai for each i ∈ I and Bj ≻j Aj for j, a contradiction to the
Pareto optimality of (A1, . . . , An) in E .
To demonstrate the second inclusion, take any core partition (A1, . . . , An)
in E . If (χA1 , . . . , χAn) is not a core allocation in E
⋄, then some coalition
S ∈ I improves upon (χA1, . . . , χAn), and hence, there exists an S-allocation
(f1, . . . , fn) such that fi ≻
⋄
i χAi for each i ∈ S. It follows from Theorem 4.1
that there exists a partition (B1, . . . , Bn) in E such that fi ∼
⋄
i χBi for each
i ∈ I, which yields Bi ≻i Ai for each i ∈ S, a contradiction to the fact that
(A1, . . . , An) is a core partition in E .
The following converse of Theorem 4.1 yields an intriguing characteri-
zation of saturation in terms of the interplay between the economy E with
preference relations with a continuous representation in a Banach space and
its extended economy E⋄ with an integral transformation.
Theorem 4.2. A finite measure space (Ω,Σ, µ) is saturated if every economy
E = {(Ω,Σ, µ), (%i,Ωi)
n
i=1} for which each %i admits a continuous represen-
tation in an infinite-dimensional Banach space and its extended economy
E⋄ = {L∞(Ω,Σ, µ),S, (%⋄i , χΩi)
n
i=1} with an integral transformation are such
that for every allocation (f1, . . . , fn) in E
⋄ there exists a partition (A1, . . . , An)
in E satisfying fi ∼
⋄
i χAi for each i ∈ I.
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Proof. Suppose that (Ω,Σ, µ) is not saturated. As noted in the proof of
Theorem 3.3, for every infinite-dimensional Banach space E, there exists
a µ-continuous vector measure m : Σ → E such that its range m(Σ) is
not convex. Then there exist x, y ∈ m(Σ) and t ∈ (0, 1) such that tx +
(1 − t)y 6∈ m(Σ). Let C,D ∈ Σ be such that x = m(C) and y = m(D)
and define f1 := tχC + (1 − t)χD ∈ S and fj := (n − 1)
−1(1 − f1) ∈ S
for j = 2, 3, . . . , n. By construction,
∑n
i=1 fi = 1. Let ϕ
⋄
1
: m(S) → R
be a continuous function with ϕ⋄1(0) = 0 that attains the maximum at the
unique point x1 :=
∫
f1dm ∈ m(S). For j = 2, 3, . . . , n, take any continuous
function ϕ⋄j : m(S)→ R with ϕ
⋄
j(0) = 0, define the preference relation %
⋄
i on
S via the formula (3.3), and denote its restriction to Σ by %i for each i ∈ I.
Then E = {(Ω,Σ, µ), (%i,Ωi)
n
i=1} is an economy for which each %i admits a
continuous representation in the common Banach space E by Theorem 3.1
and E⋄ = {L∞(Ω,Σ, µ),S, (%⋄i , χΩi)
n
i=1} is an extended economy of E with an
integral transformation. Since (f1, . . . , fn) is an allocation in E
⋄, there exists
a partition (A1, . . . , An) in E such that fi ∼
⋄
i χAi for each i ∈ I. This means
that ϕ⋄
1
(x1) = ϕ
⋄
1
(m(A1)), and hence, x1 = tx+ (1− t)y = m(A1) ∈ m(Σ), a
contradiction.
4.3 Existence Results
We present four existence results on partitions in E . We first show under
the saturation hypothesis the existence of individually rational Pareto opti-
mal partitions without any convexity assumption on the preferences of each
individual.
Theorem 4.3. If (Ω,Σ, µ) is saturated, then for every economy E =
{(Ω,Σ, µ), (%i,Ωi)
n
i=1} for which each %i admits a continuous representa-
tion in a separable Banach space, there exists an individually rational Pareto
optimal partition in E .
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4.1 that the economy E has its extended
economy E⋄ = {L∞(Ω,Σ, µ),S, (%⋄i , χΩi)
n
i=1} with an integral transforma-
tion such that for every allocation (f1, . . . , fn) in E
⋄, there exists a partition
(A1, . . . , An) in E satisfying fi ∼
⋄
i χAi for each i ∈ I. Since each %
⋄
i is rep-
resented by the form (3.3), where mi : Σ → Ei is a µ-continuous vector
measure with values in a separable Banach space Ei and ϕ
⋄
i : mi(S)→ R is a
continuous function, and A is weakly∗ compact in [L∞(Ω,Σ, µ)]n, so is AIR.
Then there exists a solution to the maximization problem:
max
{
n∑
i=1
ϕ⋄i
(∫
Ω
fi(ω)dmi
)
| (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ AIR
}
. (P)
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The individual rationality of a solution (f1, . . . , fn) to (P) is obvious. If
(f1, . . . , fn) is not Pareto optimal, then there is another allocation (g1, . . . , gn)
such that gi %
⋄
i fi for each i ∈ I and gj ≻
⋄
j fj for some j ∈ I. This
means that
∑n
i=1 ϕ
⋄
i (
∫
gidmi) >
∑n
i=1 ϕ
⋄
i (
∫
fidmi), a contradiction to the fact
that (f1, . . . , fn) is a solution to (P). Therefore, any partition (A1, . . . , An)
satisfying fi ∼
⋄
i χAi for each i ∈ I is an individually rational Pareto optimal
partition in E .
For the existence of core partitions, the convexity of preferences of each
individual are imposed additionally.
Theorem 4.4. If (Ω,Σ, µ) is saturated, then for every economy E =
{(Ω,Σ, µ), (%i,Ωi)
n
i=1} for which each %i admits a continuous convex rep-
resentation in a separable Banach space, there exists a core partition in E .
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4.1 that the economy E has its extended
economy E⋄ = {L∞(Ω,Σ, µ),S, (%⋄i , χΩi)
n
i=1} with a quasiconcave integral
transformation such that for every allocation (f1, . . . , fn) in E
⋄, there exists
a partition (A1, . . . , An) in E satisfying fi ∼
⋄
i χAi for each i ∈ I. Since each%
⋄
i
is represented by the form (3.3), where mi : Σ→ Ei is a µ-continuous vector
measure with values in a separable Banach space Ei and ϕ
⋄
i : mi(S) → R is
a continuous quasiconcave function, the utility function ν⋄i : S → R defined
by ν⋄i (f) := ϕ
⋄
i (
∫
fdmi) is weakly
∗ continuous and quasiconcave on S.
The market game V : I → 2R
n
with nontransferrable utility (NTU) for
the extended economy E⋄ is a set-valued mapping defined by:
V (S) =
{
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n
∣∣∣∣ ∃S-allocation (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ A:xi ≤ ν⋄i (fi) ∀i ∈ S
}
.
By construction, V (S) is the subset of the utility possibility set of the indi-
viduals in which payoff vectors are attainable via some coalition S ∈ I. The
core C(V ) of the NTU game V is given by:
C(V ) = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ V (I) |6 ∃(S, y) ∈ I × V (S) : xi < yi ∀i ∈ S} .
By the celebrated theorem of Scarf [47], C(V ) is nonempty if V is comprehen-
sive below and balanced, V (S) is closed and bounded from above for every
S ∈ I, and x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n, y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ V (S) and xi = yi for
each i ∈ S imply x ∈ V (S). We show that V satisfies these conditions.
It is easy to see that each V (S) is comprehensive from below, i.e., x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n, y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ V (S) and xi ≤ yi for each i ∈ I
imply x ∈ V (S). Since each ν⋄i is weakly
∗ continuous, and hence, bounded
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on the weakly∗ compact set S, for each S ∈ I there exists MS ∈ R such that
xi ≤MS for every x ∈ V (S) and i ∈ S.
We shall show that V is a balanced game. To this end, let B be a balanced
family of I with balanced weights {λS ≥ 0 | S ∈ B} and let Bi = {S ∈ B |
i ∈ S}. We then have
∑
S∈Bi
λS = 1 for each i ∈ I. Define:
χSi =
{
1 if S ∈ Bi,
0 otherwise
and tS =
1
n
∑
i∈I
λSχSi .
Then, we have:∑
S∈B
tS =
1
n
∑
S∈B
∑
i∈I
λSχSi =
1
n
∑
i∈I
∑
S∈Bi
λS = 1.
Choose any x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
⋂
S∈B V (S). Then, for every S ∈ B, there
exists an S-allocation (fS
1
, . . . , fSn ) such that xi ≤ ν
⋄
i (f
S
i ) for each i ∈ S. Let
fi =
∑
S∈B t
SfSi for each i ∈ I. Then, (f1, . . . , fn) is an allocation because
A is convex. Since xi ≤ ν
⋄
i (fi) for each i ∈ I by the quasiconcavity of ν
⋄
i ,
we have x ∈ V (I). Therefore,
⋂
S∈B V (S) ⊂ V (I), and consequently, V is
balanced.
We finally show that V (S) is closed for every S ∈ B. Let {xk}k∈N be
a sequence in V (S) converging to x ∈ Rn. Then, there exists an allocation
(fk
1
, . . . , fkn) such that x
k
i ≤ ν
⋄
i (f
k
i ) for each i ∈ S and k ∈ N. Since A is
weakly∗ compact, the sequence {(fk
1
, . . . , fkn)}k∈N contains a subsequence that
is weakly∗ convergent to (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ A. Then we have xi ≤ ν
⋄
i (fi) for each
i ∈ S by the weak∗ continuity of ν⋄i . It is easy to verify that (f1, . . . , fn) is
an S-allocation. Thus, we obtain x ∈ V (S), and hence, V (S) is closed.
Since C(V ) is nonempty, one can choose an element (x1, . . . , xn) in C(V ).
Then there exists an I-allocation (f1, . . . , fn) such that xi ≤ ν
⋄
i (fi) for each
i ∈ I. Suppose that (f1, . . . , fn) is not a core allocation in E
⋄. Then there
exists an S-allocation (g1, . . . , gn) such that ν
⋄
i (fi) < ν
⋄
i (gi) for each i ∈ S.
Then we have (ν⋄
1
(g1), . . . , ν
⋄
n(gn)) ∈ V (S) and xi < ν
⋄
i (gi) for each i ∈ S,
which contradicts the fact that (x1, . . . , xn) is in C(V ). Let (x1, . . . , xn) be
in C(V ) and define the set A(x1, . . . , xn) by:
A(x1, . . . , xn) = {(f1, . . . , fn) ∈ A | xi ≤ ν
⋄
i (fi) ∀i ∈ I} .
It follows from the above argument thatA(x1, . . . , xn) is a nonempty subset of
AC. Since A(x1, . . . , xn) is nonempty and weakly
∗ compact in [L∞(Ω,Σ, µ)]n,
according to the Krein–Milman theorem, A(x1, . . . , xn) has an extreme point
(g1, . . . , gn). Precisely in the same way with the proof of Theorem 4.1, we
can show that each gi is a characteristic function. Therefore, there exists a
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partition (A1, . . . , An) of Ω such that (χA1 , . . . , χAn) ∈ A(x1, . . . , xn). This
means that (A1, . . . , An) is a core partition in E .
For the existence of Walrasian equilibrium partitions with a positive price,
the monotonicity of preferences of each individual are imposed further.
Theorem 4.5. If (Ω,Σ, µ) is saturated, then for every economy E =
{(Ω,Σ, µ), (%i,Ωi)
n
i=1} for which each %i admits a continuous convex mono-
tone representation in a separable Banach space, there exists a Walrasian
equilibrium partition in E with a positive price.
Proof. By Proposition 2.1 and Theorem 3.1, the economy E has its ex-
tended economy E⋄ = {L∞(Ω,Σ, µ),S, (%⋄i , χΩi)
n
i=1} with a quasiconcave in-
tegral transformation such that each %⋄i is represented by the form (3.3),
where mi : Σ → Ei is a vector measure with values in a separable Ba-
nach space Ei and ϕ
⋄
i : mi(S) → R is a continuous quasiconcave function.
Since S is weakly∗ closed in L∞(Ω,Σ, µ) and each utility function defined by
ν⋄i (f) = ϕ
⋄
i (
∫
fdmi) is weakly
∗ continuous and quasiconcave on S satisfying
[5, Monotonicity Assumption], and hence, all the assumptions of [5, Theorem
1] are met for E⋄. Then there exists a Walrasian equilibrium (pˆ, (fˆ1, . . . , fˆn))
with positive price pˆ in E⋄. Define the set of Walrasian allocations associated
with the equilibrium price pˆ by:
AW (pˆ) =
{
(f1, . . . , fn) ∈ A
∣∣∣∣ fi is a maximal element for %ion B⋄i (pˆ, χΩi) ∀i ∈ I
}
.
Then AW (pˆ) is nonempty and weakly
∗ compact in [L∞(Ω,Σ, µ)]n. According
to the Krein–Milman theorem, AW (pˆ) has an extreme point (g1, . . . , gn).
Precisely in the same way as the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can show that each
gi is a characteristic function. Therefore, there exists a partition (Aˆ1, . . . , Aˆn)
of Ω such that (χAˆ1, . . . , χAˆn) ∈ AW (pˆ). This means that the price-partition
pair (pˆ, (Aˆ1, . . . , Aˆn)) is a Walrasian equilibrium with positive price pˆ in E .
Under the same assumption as Theorem 4.5 the existence of Pareto opti-
mal envy-free partitions is guaranteed.
Theorem 4.6. If (Ω,Σ, µ) is saturated, then for every economy E =
{(Ω,Σ, µ), (%i,Ωi)
n
i=1} for which each %i admits a continuous convex mono-
tone representation in a separable Banach space, there exists a Pareto optimal
envy-free partition in E .
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Proof. Let E⋄ = {L∞(Ω,Σ, µ),S, (%⋄i , χΩi)
n
i=1} be an extended economy of
E with a quasiconcave integral transformation such that for every allocation
(f1, . . . , fn) in E
⋄, there exists a partition (A1, . . . , An) in E satisfying fi ∼
⋄
i
χAi for each i ∈ I. Consider the extended economy E
⋄ = {L∞(Ω,Σ, µ),S,
(%⋄i )
n
i=1, n
−1χΩ} in which each individual possesses the equal initial endow-
ment n−1χΩ ∈ S. Then a Walrasian equilibrium (p¯, (f¯1, . . . , f¯n)) with posi-
tive price p¯ in E⋄ exists as proved in Theorem 4.5. The Walrasian allocation
(f¯1, . . . , f¯n) is Pareto optimal in E
⋄ (because of the the first welfare theorem)
and in view of the equal budget set among all individuals, it is evidently
envy free in E⋄. Take any partition (A¯1, . . . , A¯n) in E satisfying f¯i ∼
⋄
i χA¯i for
each i ∈ I. If (A¯1, . . . , A¯n) is not Pareto optimal in E , then there exists an-
other partition (A1, . . . , An) such that Ai %i A¯i for each i ∈ I and Aj ≻j A¯j
for some j ∈ I. This means that χA¯i %
⋄
i f¯i or each i ∈ I and χA¯j %
⋄
j f¯j
for j, a contradiction to the Pareto optimality of (f¯1, . . . , f¯n) in E
⋄. Hence,
(A¯1, . . . , A¯n) is a Pareto optimal partition in E . If (A¯1, . . . , A¯n) is not envy
free in E , then A¯j ≻i A¯i for some i 6= j. This implies that f¯j ≻
⋄
i f¯i, a
contradiction to the fact that (f¯1, . . . , f¯n) is envy free in E
⋄.
Remark 4.2. To obtain a countably additive equilibrium price in Theorem
4.5, the same argument as in [5], which uses the Yosida–Hewitt decomposi-
tion in ba(Σ, µ), is valid. In particular, if the extended economy E⋄ is such
that each %⋄i is monotone and has a Mackey continuous extension to the
positive cone of L∞(Ω,Σ, µ) preserving monotonicity, then [5, Theorem 2]
is applicable to the proof of Theorem 4.5, and thereby, pˆ can be taken in
L1(Ω,Σ, µ).
Remark 4.3. For an economy E in which each %i admits a continuous repre-
sentation in Rli, the existence of Walrasian equilibria (see [18]), the nonempti-
ness of the core (see [17, 39]), the nonemptiness of the fuzzy core and the
existence of supporting prices (see [19]), and the existence of Pareto optimal
α-fair partitions (see [41]) were established under the convexity hypothesis
on %i. Under the alternative continuity hypothesis on %i, the existence of
Pareto optimal envy-free partitions was given in [20] without any convexity
hypothesis on %i. For other solution concepts regarding the fair division
problems, see [40, 41, 45, 46].
5 Concluding Remarks
We conclude this paper by raising an open problem. We leave aside the
existence of supporting prices for Pareto optimal partitions under the con-
vexity assumption. The existence of supporting prices in L1(Ω,Σ, µ) was
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obtained in [19] with a finite-dimensional vector representation of preference
relations. The problem is a standard application of the separation theorem
in L∞(Ω,Σ, µ). It should be noted that thanks to Theorem 4.1, supporting
prices in an extended economy are automatically the ones in the original econ-
omy. As demonstrated in Theorem 4.3, however, for the existence of Pareto
optimal partitions, the convexity assumption is unnecessary. Thus, the chal-
lenging problem is instead to demonstrate the second fundamental theorem of
welfare economics for economies without any convexity assumption. For non-
convex production economies with an infinite-dimensional commodity space,
[28] derived a price system in the Clarke normal cone that is consistent with
a Pareto optimal allocation, and their result covers the commodity space of
L∞(Ω,Σ, µ). It is well-known that in the presence of nonconvexity Clarke
normal cones are strictly larger than Mordukhovich normal cones (see [35]),
so that price systems in the latter are called for to derive sharper necessary
conditions for Pareto optimality. It is [23] who first introduced Mordukhovich
normal cones to obtain the second welfare theorem into finite-dimensional
nonconvex production economies. For the extension of [23] to Banach or
Asplund spaces of commodities, see [3, 32, 33, 34, 36]. The second welfare
theorem without convexity assumptions specific to optimal partitions based
on Mordukhovich normal cones is still unknown.
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